The "potential approach" to value theory for finite games was introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . Here this approach is extended to non-atomic games.
Introduction.
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and successful solution concepts is that of value, originally due to Shapley (1953) .
It associates to each player in such a game a real number, which may be viewed as a kind of "expected outcome".
Recently, a new approach to value theory, called the potential approach, has been introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . It is based on the idea that one attaches a real number to each game, such that the resulting marginal contributions of all players always yield an efficient outcome. That is, these marginal contributions add up to the worth of the grand coalition. It was proved by Hart and Mas-Colell that this requirement characterizes precisely the Shapley value.
In this paper we consider "large games" where the set of players is modelled by a non-atomic continuum. Aumann and Shapley (1974) presented three approaches to value theory in such games, namely: the axiomatic approach, the random order approach, and the asymptotic approach. Here we add to these the potential approach.
Specifically, the potential P v of a game v (in an appropriate space of differentiable games) satisfies the following: The directional derivative ∂ (P v) (I, S) t dt for every coalition S). Moreover, we use the potential approach to prove the uniqueness of the Aumann-Shapley value on restrictable subspaces of pN A ∞ that contain NA. This is a generalization of the analogous theorems proved for finite games by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and by Neyman (1989) . All this is done in Section 3, after the required preliminaries in Section 2.
The power and usefulness of the potential approach is then exhibited in the study 3 of weighted values. Assume that a positive weight w(s) is attached to each player s. The appropriate weighted w-potential P w v of v turns out to be
where (t w S)(s) = t w(s) for s ∈ S and = 0 otherwise.
This enables us to define the w-value φ w v of a non-atomic game v as the (directional) derivative of the w-potential, i.e. φ w v(S) := ∂(P w v) (I, wS) . See Section 4.
Next we discuss the asymptotic approach to weighted values of non-atomic games. Here the continuum of players is partitioned into finitely many disjoint "blocks", each one of which becomes a player in the finite game generated by this partition. One then considers the values of these finite games, and their limit as the partitions become finer and finer. When there are no weights this procedure is well defined. However, in the weighted case, one needs also to assign a weight to each block Z of the partition. It is not clear at all how to do it (unless of course we are in the very special case where all players in a block have identical weights).
In Section 5 we solve this problem by showing that if the weights of all blocks Z are defined as the average weights
w(s)dλ(s) with respect to an arbitrary "population measure" λ, then the resulting asymptotic w-value is independent of the particular λ chosen. Moreover, it coincides with the w-value obtained by the potential approach.
Other work dealing with the potential approach in large games is Pazgal (1991) , which considers potential and consistency in cost allocation problems, and Hart and Mas-Colell (1995a , 1995b , 1996 which study the non-transferable utility case (where the potential leads to the egalitarian solutions and the Harsanyi NTU-value). 
Differentiable Games.
We use the standard notations established in the book of Aumann and Shapley (1974) NA-continuous extension to B 1 . We denote this extension also by v. The group of all measurable isomorphisms of (I, C) is denoted by G. For f ∈ B and θ ∈ G, we
We come now to our first definition. We will use the notation ∂v(f, g) for the directional derivative of v at f in the direction g. A game v ∈ pN A is continuously differentiable if there exists a real-valued function ∂v(., .) on B 1 × B + that satisfies the following three properties:
(2.2) For every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for every f ∈ B 1 and g ∈ B + with (f + g) ∈ B 1 and g < δ, We elaborate now on conditions (2.1)-(2.3): γ of (2.1) is the gradient of v at f .
Condition (2.2) says that v is uniformly Frechet differentiable on B
1 in non-negative directions and, in particular,
, and f + εg ∈ B 1 for sufficiently small ε > 0. Also,
, and f − εg ∈ B 1 for sufficiently small ε > 0. A detailed formulation of the continuity condition (2.3) is: For every ε > 0 there
Altogether, "uniformly continously differentiable" (or even "uniformly continously uniformly differentiable") would have been a more appropriate term; we use "continuous differentiability" for simplicity.
Let D be the set of all continuously differentiable games in pN A . We omit the obvious proof of the following lemma. 
and
Denote by AC ∞ the set of all games v ∈ BV for which there exists µ ∈ NA
It can be easily verified (see Monderer (1990) 
, and that for every v ∈ AC ∞ ∩ pN A and for every µ ∈ NA + satisfying (2.5),
for all sufficiently small |ε| > 0, where µ is given by (2.5).
Therefore (2.7) is satisfied for such f and g. By the uniform continuity of ∂v(., .),
As convergence in the ∞ norm implies convergence in the max norm, u ∈ pN A . For all n, m ≥ 1, and for all f ∈ B 1 and g ∈ B + , applying (2.7)
to v n − v m yields:
Therefore the sequence of real numbers (∂v n (f, g)) 
Potentials.
In this section we define the "potential" of a non-atomic game, and show that it yields the Aumann-Shapley value (in appropriate spaces). Recall (Hart and MasColell (1989) ) that for a finite game v with a player set N , the potential u = P v of v is uniquely defined by
In the non-atomic case, the difference u(S)−u(S \{s}) is replaced by the directional derivative ∂u(S, {s}), and the left-hand side of (*) becomes ∂u(S, S) when ∂u(f, g)
is additive in g (as is the case for u in D; recall (2.1)). Thus we have the following formal definition.
Let v ∈ pN A . We say that u is a potential for v if u is continuously differentiable (i.e., u ∈ D) and
∂u(S, S) = v(S) for every S ∈ C.
The set of all games in pN A that have a potential is denoted by P OT . There is no loss of generality in restricting ourselves to games in pN A . If v ∈ BV , and u ∈ D is a potential for v, then by the NA-continuity of ∂u (., .) , v is NA-continuous.
Therefore by Mertens (1980) Lemma 3.1. Every game v ∈ P OT has a unique potential P v given by
Proof. Let u ∈ D be a potential for v. By the NA-continuity of both v and ∂u(., .),
Since u ∈ D, (3.2) implies that v(tS) t is continuous on the closed interval [0, 1],
when we define its value at t = 0 by ∂u(0, S). Hence, by integrating both sides of 
Corollary 3.2. P OT is a linear symmetric restrictable subspace of pN A . Moreover, P : P OT −→ D is a linear positive operator, and for every v ∈ P OT ,
Lemma 3.3. Every continuously differentiable game has a potential. That is, D ⊆ P OT , and for every
is continuous on the closed interval [0, 1], when its value at t = 0 is defined as ∂v(0, S) = lim t→0 +
v(tS) t
. Therefore, the following operator Q is well-defined:
It is now easily verified that Qv ∈ D; indeed,
for every f ∈ B 1 and g ∈ B + , satisfies (2.1)-(2.3).
Let v ∈ D ∞ . Let γ ∈ NA + satisfy (2.6) for v. Then it satisfies (2.6) for P v by (3.3). Therefore P v ∈ AC ∞ , and
Remark. The following example shows that the potential operator cannot be naturally extended from pN A ∞ to pN A, even if we relax some of its differentiability properties (i.e., we do not require
where f (t) = − 
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Hence, the potential formula of Lemma 3.1 cannot be extended to v.
For every v ∈ P OT and S ∈ C define ψv(S) := ∂(P v)(I, S).
Proposition 3.5. ψ is a value on P OT . Moreover, the restriction of ψ to pN A ∞ is the Aumann-Shapley value φ.
Proof. The proof that ψ is a value follows from Corollary 3.2. By Monderer (1990) , φ is the unique value on pN A ∞ . Therefore ψ = φ on pN A ∞ .
In the following theorem we prove the uniqueness of the value on restrictable subspaces of pN A ∞ that contain NA (the same proof works also for restrictable subspaces of D ∞ that contain NA). This is the non-atomic version of the analogous result for finite games proved by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and by Neyman (1989) . Proof. Letφ be a value on Q. By Monderer (1990) there exists a Borel probability measure ξ on [0, 1] such that for every w ∈ Q,
Now,P w ∈ D:
for every f ∈ B 1 , g ∈ B + , satisfies (2.1)-(2.3). Hence, by (3.5) and (3.4), for every
ThereforeP w is a potential for w, and by Lemma 3.1,P w = P w.
By (3.4), ∂(P w)(I, S) =φw(S) for every w ∈ Q and S ∈ C. By Lemma 3.5, ∂(P w)(I, S) = φw(S) for every such w and S. Henceφ = φ on Q.
Weighted Potentials and Weighted Values.
We now generalize the approach of the previous section to the "weighted" case.
That is, in addition to the game, to each player s there is given a fixed weight w(s) > 0. For finite games, the corresponding weighted potential u = P w v is uniquely defined by
In the non-atomic case the left-hand side of (**) becomes s∈S w(s)∂u (S, {s}) . If ∂u(., .) is linear in the second argument (again, recall (2.1)), this equals ∂u (S, wS) ,
Formally, let w ∈ B + . We say that w is a weight function if it is bounded away from zero. That is, there exists β > 0 such that w(s) ≥ β for every s ∈ I. Let v ∈ pN A . We say that u is a weighted w-potential for v if u ∈ D and
∂u(S, wS) = v(S) for all S ∈ C.
Denote by P OT w the set of all games in pN A that have a w-potential.
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Lemma 4.1. Every game v ∈ P OT w has a unique w-potential P w v given by
Proof. Let v ∈ P OT w and let u ∈ D be a w-potential for v. By (2.4) there exists
Let S ∈ C. For every 0 < t ≤ 1 define h(t) := u(t w S). By (2.2), (2.3) and the boundedness of w, we obtain h (t) = ∂u(t w S, wt w−1 S). Therefore h is continuous on (0, 1]. We claim that it is integrable on [0, 1]. Indeed,
where β is a positive lower bound of w. Therefore, h is absolutely continuous on
Corollary 4.2. P OT w is a linear symmetric restrictable subspace of pN A , and
The proof of the next theorem is in the spirit of all previous proofs and therefore we omit it. Proof. Immediate. Note that ψ w v ∈ NA by (2.1), and that the "moreover" statement follows from Monderer (1990) : any linear positive projection on a subspace of AC ∞ that contains NA has ∞ -norm at most 1.
We will thus call ψ w v the weighted w-value of v.
Asymptotic Weighted Values.
In the previous section the weighted value was obtained by the potential ap-
proach. An alternative method is the "asymptotic approach": Approximating the non-atomic games by finite games and considering the limit of the corresponding finite weighted values. As usual, the finite approximations are obtained by partitions of the set of players I into finitely many blocks. The problem is, which weight should one associate to each block Z ? If a "population measure" λ were given, one could take the average of the weights w(s) with respect to λ, that is, (s) . We shall show below that this approach works in the sense that, independently of the population measure λ, it yields in the limit precisely the weighted value obtained by the potential in Section 4.
For λ ∈ NA + we denote by AC 0 (λ) the set of all games v ∈ BV such that every null set of λ is a null set of v. That is, λ(I \ T ) = 0 implies that T is a carrier of v,
We denote by AC(λ) the set of all games in AC that are absolutely continuous with respect to λ, and we denote by AC ∞ (λ) the set of all games v for which
|v(S) − v(T )| ≤ λ(S) − λ(T ) for all T ⊆ S ∈ C.
Obviously 
